

Crises in the Subcontinent and Understanding Chinese Intentions

Adveetya Kachiar

Research Assistant, Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi

adveetya.kachiar@gmail.com

Abstract

South Asia is at the brink of a crisis. Relations between India and China, and India and Pakistan are at an all-time low. The current border standoff between the Indian and Chinese troops along the Line of Actual Control that began in May and resulted in the death of twenty Indian soldiers – the first combat fatalities in 45 years - has eroded any trust that remained between the two countries and upended any progress made over the past few decades. Through its growing economic expansion and influence, China appears to have achieved a unique position where it can shape the regional dynamics in South Asia. On the other hand, Beijing's rising antagonism towards India, the competition between the two, is making the region highly unstable and the future – uncertain. The article attempts to explore the reasons behind the Chinese hostilities towards India and its impact on regional stability.

Keywords

China, South Asia, India, LAC

The ICS is an interdisciplinary research institution, which has a leadership role in the promotion of Chinese and East Asian Studies in India. The ICS Analysis aims to encourage debate and provide informed and balanced inputs for policy formulation and is based on extensive research and interactions with a wide community of scholars, experts, diplomats and military personnel in India and abroad.

An international crisis is “a set of rapidly unfolding events which raises the impact of destabilising forces in the general system or any of its systems substantially above normal levels (i.e., average) and increases the likelihood of violence occurring in the system’ (Young, 1967: 10). It is also a ‘breakpoint of relations along the peace/war continuum’ between two actors (Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 1987). It may be apposite to consider South Asia today as being on the brink of multiple crises. Relations between India and China, and India and Pakistan are at an all-time low. The current border standoff between the Indian and Chinese troops along the Line of Actual Control that began in May and resulted in the death of twenty Indian soldiers – the first combat fatalities in 45 years - has eroded any trust that remained between the two countries and upended any progress made over the past few decades. Similarly, the relations between India and Pakistan are also frozen since the BJP-led government’s decision to erode Jammu & Kashmir’s semi-autonomous status and integrate it into the country by splitting it into two Union territories, Jammu & Kashmir, and Ladakh.

Beijing’s rising antagonism towards India, the competition between the two makes the region highly unstable and its future uncertain.

Given its close partnership with Pakistan, the expansion of its economic and strategic influence within that country and more widely in South Asia, China appears to have achieved a unique position where it can shape the regional dynamics. On the other hand, Beijing’s rising antagonism towards India, the competition between the two makes the region highly unstable and its future uncertain. The article attempts to explore the reasons behind the Chinese hostilities towards India and its impact on regional stability. The article is divided into three sections: first, it maps how two significant moves by Narendra Modi-led government has changed regional dynamics, and what impact it might have had on China’s strategy vis-à-vis India; second, it looks at China’s growing influence in the region and how it has resulted in degradation of trust between India and China; and thirdly, it looks at the strategic calculations of China’s aggressive posturing against India and its impact on their relations and beyond.

Escalations, miscalculations, and continued hostility

In 2019, two significant moves were taken by the BJP government that affected its relations with Pakistan and China. First, for the first time since 1971 – the Indian Air Force crossed the Line of Control (LoC) and targeted Jaish-e-Mohammad’s camps deep inside the Pakistani territory causing Indian and Pakistani forces to

engage in direct air combat. The Modi government's decision to respond through force to the Pulwama attack in order to deter any future attacks originating from Pakistani territory led to a shift in the India – Pakistan deterrence dynamic. For decades, India has looked for ways to contain the threats emanating from Pakistani territory including the incursions across the LoC as well as its unabated support to Islamic militant groups. With the nuclearisation of the subcontinent, Pakistan used its nuclear weapons as a way to deter conventional attack by India in response to such attacks by its proxies (Narang, 2010).

Even after the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack that led to the deaths of 170 people, Delhi chose not to use the kinetic option at its disposal

After the attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001 and the slow mobilisation of forces along the LoC in the reaction of the attack, the Indian Army in 2004 had even come up with a new limited war doctrine, *Cold Start* – which would allow India to mobilise its troops quickly and facilitate its taking of retaliatory measures in case of an attack or an incursion by Pakistani forces (Ladwig III, 2008). The Indian policy towards Pakistan has been one of studied caution and restraint on the military front so as not to reach the nuclear threshold or risk escalating the conflict and of trying to isolate it

diplomatically on the international stage. Even after the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack that led to the deaths of 170 people, Delhi chose not to use the kinetic option at its disposal (Lalwani and Haegeland, 2018) and decided that much was to be gained by not resorting to force (Menon 2017). The BJP government under Narendra Modi's leadership came to power by promising to deal with cross-border terrorism with a firm hand (BJP Election Manifesto, 2014). In an already hostile relationship, the Balakot attack has added one more chapter on the escalation ladder between the long-time rivals. The attack by the Indian Air Force deep inside Pakistan's territory targeting the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) camps does not signify a textbook response to a future attack. However, it has provided Delhi options to deter the state-sponsored cross-border terrorism. The move to respond to Pakistan's continued use of sub-conventional warfare – the advantages of which both Islamabad and Beijing have enjoyed for many years (Small, 2015), could have also been interpreted by Beijing as a show of strength, where India will no longer anxiously look to threats emanating from Rawalpindi. Second, Narendra Modi-led government's decision to scrap Article 370 of the Indian Constitution that granted special status to the state of Jammu & Kashmir and splitting it into two Union territories of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh was widely seen domestically as a decisive break from past policies. The unilateral action was criticised

widely by both Pakistan and China. In a statement, China declared its opposition to the move as “unacceptable”, and the “inclusion of Chinese territory in the western sector of the China-India boundary” as having “undermined Chinese territorial sovereignty by unilaterally changing the domestic laws” (Chunying, 2019). Since then, on behalf of Pakistan, Beijing tried to bring the issue for discussion in the UN Security Council.

The recent standoff has resulted in the deployment of thousands of troops and heavy equipment on both sides of the de facto border.

China, which controls Aksai Chin - a 15,000 square miles stretch of territory acquired during the 1962 Sino-Indian war, part of the disputed territory in the western sector, is currently locked in a standoff with India in the eastern region of Ladakh. The tensions and the killing of more than a dozen soldiers on the Indian side has derailed the considerable progress made over the past few decades on India-China relations. The recent standoff has resulted in the deployment of thousands of troops and heavy equipment on both sides of the de facto border. The number of transgressions by the Chinese side has also increased in recent years – with standoffs also lasting much longer (Rossow et. al. 2020). The number of transgressions increased in 2017 to

426 from 2016, which only had a total of 273 transgressions, again falling to 327 in 2018 (Naik, 2019) “indicating PLA’s assertiveness and sensitivity to its claims on the Northern borders” (Ministry of Defense Annual Report, 2018).

The Ladakh region that also includes Aksai Chin and Shaksgam Tract - currently under Chinese control is strategically vital for China. Aksai Chin serves as the only road connection linking China’s landlocked regions of Xinjiang and Tibet with the National Highway G219, also known as the Yela Highway. The area is also crucial as it neighbours Gilgit-Baltistan - a part of the disputed Jammu & Kashmir region administered by Pakistan, through which the strategically important Karakoram Highway passes and where China is actively involved in developing various infrastructure and energy projects under its Belt and Road Initiative. The highway connects Kashgar of Xinjiang to Karachi and Gwadar in the Arabian sea via the Khunjerab Pass – where it has built a deep-sea water port as part of the CPEC, and which could be a way of overcoming the “Malacca Straits dilemma” by looking for an alternate shipping route for its oil and natural gas supplies coming from the Middle Eastern region. The recent Chinese moves to acquire territory in the Ladakh region in May have also been argued by many as a result of last year’s decision by the Indian government to repeal

Article 370, which China claims as part of its territory.

Even if abrogation of Article 370 is just a pretext and not the actual reason for Chinese transgression on the border areas, the aggression on the border is Beijing's way to retaliate against several moves taken by New Delhi in the past few years, from its challenge to PLA troops in Doklam in 2017, to its developing closer proximity with the US, deepening defense engagement and support for Washington's "Indo-Pacific strategy", while keeping its own overall strategic designs ambiguous. The recent tensions reflect an extensive challenge for India on the domestic as well as the international front, as it is likely that the LAC will remain heavily militarized, forcing Delhi to invest troops and resources along with the border areas, meanwhile also dealing with an economic slowdown and a raging pandemic (Singh, 2020).

China's outreach to the Taliban and continued support to the Iran nuclear deal indicates that it is not opposed to being a part of the conflict-resolution process or conflict-averting process

The current crisis-like scenario also puts the stability of the region at risk where the powers involved are more willing to raise the stakes by choosing to escalate as a way to deter its

enemies (Tarapore, 2020). In such a toxic environment, the risks of miscalculations and misinterpretations are higher which can further lead to the escalation of the crisis or a conflict.

Do greater stakes mean greater responsibility?

China's rise in influence and status in the recent decades presented it with a unique opportunity to play a more significant role on issues concerning peace and stability regionally as well as globally. Its outreach to the Taliban and continued support to the Iran nuclear deal indicates that it is not opposed to being a part of the conflict-resolution process or conflict-averting process, even where admittedly this ties closely with its national interests. Expansion of Beijing's economic interests provides more so the reason for it to be a part of resolving the crisis that threatens its interests. Xi Jinping's Belt and Road Initiative, declared in 2013, a policy strategy to enhance its role in the world by developing trade routes and infrastructure spanning across Asia and Europe and aiming to boost trade and capital, makes it an important stakeholder in the stability of both the continents.

Beijing has made inroads in South Asia with its vast developments through the BRI and its growing naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Under the Xi Jinping's policy for the

‘New Era’¹ (Doyon et. al. 2017), South Asia acquired a renewed strategic significance in its foreign policy. It views the region as a part of its periphery, a key area of its core interests. The subcontinent borders China’s most vulnerable western region that includes Xinjiang and Tibet, therefore, maintaining security and stability in and around South Asia is essential for China, so that it does not spill over to Xinjiang and Tibet that houses twenty out of fifty-five minorities in the country.

Any instability in the neighbouring country of Pakistan and Afghanistan or escalation of a crisis can have implications for China’s national security

The rise in fundamentalism in the western region of China and the bordering nations is already a challenge for the party. During the era of ‘reform and opening up’, mostly the coastal areas of China saw growth and development, which is the primary reason for today’s increasing rural-urban divide and

¹ An essential aspect of the so-called ‘Xi Jinping Thought’, also known as ‘Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era’. According to this, every era can be distinguished by its principal contradiction, and by correctly identifying this contradiction, the party can adapt itself to the changing reality and work towards the socialist cause. The central contradiction in Xi’s ‘new era’ as identified by him can be found “between unbalanced and inadequate development and the people’s ever-growing needs for a better life”. Another aspect of this era’s principal contradiction is defining a “**new type of great power relations**” which will be different from the likes of relations between great powers during the Cold War.

unequal distribution of wealth in the country (Kumar, 2019). To counter this, the Chinese government came up with the Western Development Strategy in 1999 – aimed at gradually eliminating regional disparities in the western region and ensuring border, and social stability. Any instability in the neighbouring country of Pakistan and Afghanistan or escalation of a crisis can have implications for China’s national security and can foil the progress made so far in the landlocked region of Xinjiang and Tibet.

Chinese investments in the region under the Belt and Road initiative have also grown substantially. Beijing has invested or committed more than \$150 billion in and around India’s neighbourhood (Bhandari and Jindal, 2018). It is also investing in the financial systems of these countries by taking stakes in the stock exchanges and cultivating trade dominated by the Yuan (ibid). It is currently involved in developing ports, highways, and rail networks in almost all the South Asian countries except India and Bhutan. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a US\$62 billion project, which is the largest of BRI initiative, plans to link China’s landlocked Xinjiang autonomous region to the Arabian Sea through overland routes and to develop a deep-sea port in Gwadar as the endpoint through Karakoram highway.

Beijing, also signed a deal with Sri Lanka leasing the Hambantota Port for 99 years, after

the Sri Lankan government struggled to pay the debt it had taken on from China to build the port. It is also involved in a range of projects from upgrading the Chittagong port to constructing coal-powered plants in Chittagong and Payra in Bangladesh, to developing a China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) – which involves a plan to connect China’s southern province of Yunnan with Mandalay – Myanmar’s second-largest city. The corridor will further expand to include Yangon and Kyaukpyu in Rakhine state, where China is building a deep-sea port as part of its BRI initiative (Anadolu Agency, 2020).

Reports have suggested the possibility of dual-use of the ports for civilians as well as military purposes by the Chinese to defend its interests in the Indian Ocean (Singh, 2020). The CPEC that cuts through Gilgit-Baltistan, the northern part of the disputed Kashmir region has always been opposed by New Delhi, due to the violation of its territorial sovereignty. According to unconfirmed reports in 2010, some 7,000 to 10,000 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers were deployed in the Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (PoK) (Harrison, 2010). Later reports have suggested the presence of 7,000 non-combat soldiers in the region which comprised of construction, communications and engineering units of the PLA (Harrison, 2010, cited in Rajghatta, 2010). The Hambantota seaport, just a few hundred miles off the shore of India, which sits along a critical commercial and military

waterway, has been previously used to dock Chinese naval submarines as well (Abi-Habib, 2018).

China’s increasing investments in the regions do not translate into a reduced sphere of influence for India

These reports and the overall Chinese behaviour, have fed into the insecurities of Indian policymakers. For long, India has prepared itself that it will likely have to fight a two-front war with China and Pakistan, and recent tensions have only made that possibility a little too “realistic”. With China’s expanding economic outreach, it could have been well suited to play an essential role in managing the crises in the region. On the other hand, with the ongoing pandemic - its wolf warrior diplomacy, debt-trap diplomacy, alleged interference in the political spheres of foreign nations such as in the case of Sri Lanka, and its current military standoff along the LAC with India, all Beijing seems to have done is to have undermined its position through its unreliability, aggressive posturing and the creation of a sense of ambiguity and suspicion about its actions. China’s increasing investments in the regions do not translate into a reduced sphere of influence for India. Nevertheless, it has significantly increased competition in the region between the two powers despite the massive gap in their respective capabilities, where the two are

fighting for the attention of the smaller nations. As China is expanding its foothold around India's neighbourhood, India has looked to develop closer ties with China's neighbouring countries in the South East and East Asia, to balance Beijing's influence.

A quest for dominance?

In 1962, Jawaharlal Nehru stated,

“It is a little naive to think that the trouble with China was essentially due to a dispute over some territories. It had deeper reasons. Two of the largest countries in Asia confronted each other. They differed in many ways. And the test was whether any one of them would have a more dominating position than the other on the border and in Asia itself.” (Nehru, 1962, cited in Small, 2014: 73)

The competition between India and China has intensified, extending from the peaks of the Himalayas to the deeper parts of the Indian Ocean. As India has grown closer to the US, this has made Beijing uncomfortable – which perceives the growing proximity as a policy of containment against its rising power and influence. The economic relations between India and China has seen an upward trajectory, with the total trade amounting to the US \$92.1 billion in 2018 (Observer of Economic

Complexity), but the overall tenor of relations have seen a downward trend with deep-seated mistrust, especially after the Doklam crisis and the recent Galwan clash. India has taken a significant lead in banning more than a hundred Chinese apps including TikTok, and also tightened restrictions on Chinese companies looking to bid for contracts in the country (Hayakawa, 2020) - part of economic retaliation over the border conflict. For long, the power differential between India and China was seen as the defining factor in their relations – China is a US \$13.6 trillion economy, more than five times that of India – which had a GDP of US \$2.72 trillion. However, as argued by Srikanth Konadappalli, New Delhi's response to the clash in Galwan valley may have overcome this power differential (Roche, 2020). The recent clash and competition demonstrate differences in perception over their role in the region and on the world stage. According to Amb. Shyam Saran, the former foreign secretary of India, Beijing has always dismissed India's role in international affairs as that of a “pretender too big for its boots”, whereas the superpower status of China is a “manifest destiny” (Saran, 2013, cited in Small, 2014: 72). Despite this perceived difference in power, China pursued the policy of balancing in South Asia, where it has used Pakistan as a constant check against India's rising power.

Beijing cultivated a relationship with Islamabad since the 1950s based on their shared concern of balancing against India. Pakistan received support through continued sales of arms and nuclear technology as China looked to balance India. Its main goal remains to tie down India to the South Asian region. Pakistan is the biggest importer of arms and technology from China. In 2018 – 2019, China was the largest exporter of arms to Pakistan with a total of \$866 million worth of arms sold (SIPRI Arms Trade Data).

Beijing has stepped up its naval activity in the Indian Ocean littoral by developing ports and pipelines and setting up its first overseas military base in Djibouti in 2017.

China's strategy vis-a-vis both India and Pakistan had been to perpetuate the mistrust between the two, in order to maintain the balance of power in the South Asian region. It provided support to Pakistan during the 1965 and gave strategic reassurance in the 1971 war, as well as supported it in its pursuit of plebiscite in Kashmir. It has sought to contain India within South Asia, keeping it off-balance, so it does not become a challenger to China. With rising investments, China has come to bear the brunt of terrorist forces in Pakistan – where the Chinese are increasingly being targeted and killed, Beijing has, for a long time differentiated between the terrorist forces -

supported by Rawalpindi, attacking India and the forces that might target China. Its support and refusal to blacklist Masood Azhar, the founder-in-chief of Jaish-e-Mohammad group, in the UN Sanctions List that targeted India on several occasions shows that Beijing has significantly enjoyed the fruits of proxy terrorism that had led to diverting Indian attention and resources towards Islamabad.

India and China are also vying for influence in the Indian Ocean. China's ambitions coupled with its rise in economic and military power is making it look for ways to satisfy its needs and continue on the path of development – which is resulting in China voyaging far from its eastern shores and expand its presence in the Indian Ocean. The ocean sits along the most vital sea lanes in the world. Almost 80 per cent of seaborne trade in oil passes through the choke points in the region – with 45 per cent from Strait of Hormuz, 35 per cent through the Straits of Malacca and 8 per cent through Bab el-Mandeb (DeSilva-Ranasinghe, 2011). Beijing has stepped up its naval activity in the Indian Ocean littoral by developing ports and pipelines and setting up its first overseas military base in Djibouti in 2017. Due to its expanding expeditionary activities, China is also modernizing its naval forces, that began in 2015. As part of the modernization program, the PLA Navy is developing surface combatants. It includes guided-missile cruisers (Type 055), destroyers (Type 052C/D), and frigates (Type 054A), which might be deployed

in the Indian Ocean region (White, 2020). As China seeks to gain an economic and strategic advantage in the IOR, India is seen as a challenger to China – which will ensure freedom of navigation and maintain peace in the region. The Indian Navy also conducts regular exercises in the region with the US, Japan and now Australia – which are also part of the so-called grouping, Quad. China views the informal grouping and the overall concept of the “Indo-Pacific” as part of an encirclement strategy headed and directed by its arch-rival US. New Delhi, in its response to China’s maritime ambitions in the IOR, is also taking several steps to dissuade one power’s dominance in its backyard. It is currently involved in developing a port in Chabahar in Iran’s Sistan-Baluchistan province, a maiden deep-sea port in Indonesia’s Sabang, and in securing military access to the port of Duqm in Oman (Mishra, 2019).

Currently, India and China are engaged in commander-level talks, and the foreign ministers of the two countries also came up with a five-point action plan to de-escalate and maintain ‘peace and tranquillity’ over the border

Conclusion

A crisis is a breakpoint of relations along the peace/war continuum, which can raise the

impact of destabilising forces above usual and increase the possibility of a conflict. The standoff that began in June and has been going on now for the past six months will likely go on for some time as both sides have refused to withdraw their troops. The tensions in the border areas, its assertive campaign in South China Sea and the Taiwan Straits, indicate that Beijing is more than willing to draw itself into crisis-like situations in order to gain tactical advantages and to teach a ‘lesson’ to any power that takes a harder stance against its policies. Currently, India and China are engaged in commander-level talks, and the foreign ministers of the two countries also came up with a five-point action plan (Haidar and Krishnan, 2020) to de-escalate and maintain ‘peace and tranquillity’ over the border. However, the two sides have not been able to come up with any tangible solutions so far. Delhi banned several Chinese apps in retaliation – a move that is now being followed by others, however an economic decoupling between the two countries remains unlikely for now. Growing economic prowess has provided China with a heightened sense of confidence and self-image, and where it is trying to shape the Asian age as China’s age.

The gap between China and India’s capabilities is massive – China’s GDP is almost five times of India, so is Beijing’s defense budget reaching \$261 billion in 2019 compared to India’s defense expenditure of \$71.1 billion in

2019 (SIPRI Press Release 2019). It also possesses a quantitative and technological advantage over the Indian armed forces from fourth- and fifth- generation aircrafts, diesel electric submarines and multiple rocket launch systems (Kilman et. al. 2019). The PLA has also made improvements to enhance troop mobilization in the border areas by developing infrastructure and bringing the Indian border into a single unified theatre command. Indian Army, on the other hand, is also building roads and infrastructure that will provide it with greater mobility and operational awareness – one of the reasons provided by China for frictions along the LAC. Even with gaps in material capabilities, India remains a more experienced party – as it has fought several limited and low-level conflicts with Pakistan.

With nationalist sentiments running high in both countries, the possibilities of a crisis becoming a full-blown conflict are increasing. It will be difficult for both to back down in a crisis-like situation, due to the fear of seeming weak. As relations slide into the area of mistrust, the probability of misperceptions and miscalculations are also rising. However, is this what China wants – a crisis escalated into a conflict? In a raging pandemic, Beijing has opened multiple fronts where it is currently dealing with a push against its tougher policies. The India-China border remains a secondary strategic direction, nevertheless, important due to its rising stakes in the region as well as

India's growing tilt towards the US – which it sees as a challenge to China's dominance. However, does Beijing truly believe that when push comes to shove India will accept China's regional dominance and buckle down to avoid an economically disastrous and debilitating armed conflict?

References

- Abi-Habib, Maria. 2018. How China got Sri Lanka to Cough Up a Port, *The New York Times*, June 25
<https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/world/asia/china-sri-lanka-port.html?auth=login-google>
- Bharatiya Janata Party. 2014. Election Manifesto 2014. *The Hindu Archive*.
https://www.thehindu.com/multimedia/archive/01830/BJP_election_manif_1830927a.pdf
- Brecher, Michael R. and Wilkenfeld, Jonathan. 1982. *Crises in World Politics*. World Politics, Vol. 34, No. 3, April, 380-417
- Chunying, Hua. 2019, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Remarks on the Indian Government's Announcement of the Establishment of the Ladakh Union Territory Which Involves Chinese Territory, August 6
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2535_665405/t1686549.shtml

- DeSilva-Ranasinghe, Sergei. 2011. Why the Indian Ocean Matters, *The Diplomat*, March 2 <https://thediplomat.com/2011/03/why-the-indian-ocean-matters/>
- Haidar, Suhasini and Krishnan, Ananth. 2020. India, China agree on 5-point plan to de-escalate LAC stand-off, *The Hindu*, September 11 <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/lac-standoff-india-china-agree-on-5-point-plan-for-resolving-border-tension/article32577886.ece>
- Harrison, Selig S. 2010. China's Discreet Hold on Pakistan's Borderlands, *The New York Times*, August 26 <https://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/27/opinion/27iht-edharrison.html>
- Hayakawa, Akira. 2020. India Freezes out Chinese Companies from Government Bidding, *Nikkei Asia*, July 30 <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/India-freezes-out-Chinese-companies-from-government-bidding>
- Holbig, Heike, Mittelstaedt, Jean Christopher, Sautin, Yevgen and Stanzel, Angela. 2017. China's "New Era" with Xi Jinping Characteristics, *European Council on Foreign Relations*, December 15 https://ecfr.eu/publication/chinas_new_era_with_xi_jinping_characteristics7243/
- Kumar, Sanjeev. 2019. China's South Asia Policy in the 'New Era', *India Quarterly*, 75(2), 137-154.
- Kliman, Daniel, Rehman, Iskander, Lee, Kristine, and Fitt, Joshua. 2019. Imbalance of Power: India's Military Choices in an Era of Strategic Competition with China, *Center for New American Security*, October 23. <https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/imbalance-of-power>
- Ladwig III, Walter C. 2008. A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine, *International Security*, Vol. 32, No. 3, Winter 2007/2008, 158-190
- Lalwani, Sameer and Haegeland, Hannah (ed.). 2018. *Investigating Crises: South Asia's Lessons, Evolving Dynamics, and Trajectories*. Washington, DC: Stimson Centre.
- Menon, Shivshankar. 2017. *Choices: The Making of Indian Foreign Policy*. Brookings Institution: Washington DC.
- Ministry of Defence. 2018. Annual Report (2017-18), <https://www.mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/AR1718.pdf>
- Mishra, Vivek. 2019. Consolidating India's Indian Ocean Strategy, *The Diplomat*, June 7 <https://thediplomat.com/2019/06/consolidating-indias-indian-ocean-strategy/>
- Naik, Shripad. 2019. Ministry of Defence Answer to Transgression in Indian Territory by China in Lok Sabha, November 27 <http://loksabhaph.nic.in/Questions/QResult15.a>

[spx?qref=7965&lsno=17](https://www.economiccomplexity.com/observer/2018/09/17/observer-of-economic-complexity-2018-china-and-india-trade)

Narang, Vipin. 2010. Posturing for Peace? Pakistan's Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability, *International Security*, Vol. 34, No.3, Winter 2010, 38-78

Observer of Economic Complexity. 2018 China (CHN) and India (IND) Trade, *Observer of Economic Complexity*

<https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/chn/partner/ind>

Press Release. 2020. Global Military Expenditure sees largest annual increase in a decade – says SIPRI – reaching \$1917 billion in 2019, *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute*, April 27

<https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2020/global-military-expenditure-sees-largest-annual-increase-decade-says-sipri-reaching-1917-billion>

Rajghatta, Chidanand. 2010. Pak has ceded control of Gilgit in PoK to China: US Scholar, *The Economic Times*, September 29
<https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/pak-had-ceded-control-of-gilgit-in-pok-to-china-us-scholar/articleshow/6526589.cms>

Roche, Elizabeth. 2020. Interview with Srikanth Kondapalli, Border Tussle has debunked the myth of asymmetry in power, *Livemint*, September 14

<https://www.livemint.com/news/india/india-china->

[border-standoff-has-negated-notions-of-asymmetry-in-power-11599977765714.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/india-china-are-taking-new-risks-along-their-border-it-will-be-hard-to-restore-peace/2020-09-16/)

Rossow, Richard M., Bermudez Jr., Joseph S., and Kriti Upadhyaya. 2020. A Frozen line in the Himalayas, *Center for Strategic and International Studies Briefs*, August
<https://www.csis.org/analysis/frozen-line-himalayas>

Singh, Sushant. 2020. Modi's Himalayan Dilemma: A Border Clash With China Leaves Few Good Options, *Foreign Affairs*, October 6
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-10-06/modis-himalayan-dilemma>

Small, Andrew. 2015. *The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia's New Geopolitics*, Oxford University Press: New York.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Arms Trade Importer/Exporter TIV Tables, *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute*
<https://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php>

Tarapore, Arzan. 2020. India and China are taking new risks along their Border. It will be harder to restore Peace, *Monkey Cage*, *Washington Post*, September 16
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/09/16/india-china-are-taking-new-risks-along-their-border-it-will-be-hard-to-restore-peace/>

White, Joshua T. 2020. China's Indian Ocean Ambitions: Investment, Influence and Military Advantage, *Brookings Institution*, June.
<https://www.brookings.edu/research/chinas-indian-ocean-ambitions/>

Young, Oran R. 1967. *The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p.10

Adveetya Kachiar is currently working as a Research Assistant at the Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi. Previously she worked as a Research Assistant at the Institute of Conflict Management. Her work there mainly focused on creating an Armed Conflict Database in the South Asian region.

The views expressed here are those of the author and not necessarily of the Institute of Chinese Studies.

Issue No/ Month	Title	Author
No. 121 October	The Belt and Road Initiative in the Post-Covid-19 World	Aadil Sud
No.120 Oct 2020	Deciphering India's dependency on Chinese imports	Santosh Pai
No.119 Oct 2020	India as Teacher by Negative Example: Chinese Perceptions of India During the British Colonial Period and Their Impact on India China Relations	Shyam Saran
No. 118 Sept 2020	Growing Chinese Engagement in Bangladesh: Implications for India	Sayantana Haldar
No. 117 August2020	Sino-Japanese Relations: Forced Engagement or Healthy Rivalry?	Mohd Adnan
No. 116 August 2020	Clashes in Trade and Causes of Migration: The Case of India and China as the Dynamic to the World	Sangit Sarita Dwivedi
No. 115 August 2020	Covid-19 and the Communist Party of China's Governance Crisis	Bhim B. Subba
No. 114 July2020	The Emergence of a New Kingpin in the Pacific: China's Initiatives	Tanishka
No. 113 July 2020	Clash of Narratives: The US-China Propaganda War Amid the Global Pandemic	Preksha Shree Chhetri
No.112 July 2020	Sino-Indian Border Dispute: Explained in Constructivist Paradigm	Reena Bhatia

PRINCIPAL SUPPORTERS TO ICS RESEARCH FUND

TATA TRUSTS



MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA



INDIAN COUNCIL OF
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH

GARGI AND VIDYA
PRAKASH DUTT FOUNDATION



JAMNALAL BAJAJ
FOUNDATION

PIROJSHA GODREJ FOUNDATION

ICS PUBLICATIONS



A short brief on a topic of contemporary interest with policy-related inputs



Platform for ongoing research of the ICS faculty and associates



Authored by the faculty, also emerging from research projects and international conferences



Draft paper of ongoing research

ICS JOURNAL



In its 56th year, *China Report* is a refereed journal in the field of social sciences and international relations. It welcomes and offers a platform for original research from a multi-disciplinary perspective, in new and emerging areas, by scholars and research students. It seeks to promote analysis and vigorous debate on all aspects of Sino-Indian relations, India-China comparative studies and multilateral and bilateral initiatives and collaborations across Asia.

China Report is brought out by Sage Publications Ltd, New Delhi.

Editor
Associate Editor
Assistant Editor
Book Review Editor

Sreemati Chakrabarti
G. Balatchandirane
Rityusha Mani Tiwari
Vijay K Nambiar



INSTITUTE OF CHINESE STUDIES

8/17, Sri Ram Road, Civil Lines,
Delhi 110054, INDIA
T: +91 (0) 11 2393 8202
F: +91 (0) 11 2383 0728

<http://www.icsin.org/>

info@icsin.org



twitter.com/ics_delhi



facebook.com/icsin.delhi



in.linkedin.com/icsdelhi



soundcloud.com/ICSIN



youtube.com/ICSWEB



instagram.com/icsdelhi

