



**A Study of Colonial India's Border Making  
Project vis-à-vis China ( 1890-1947)**

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**ICS OCCASIONAL PAPER NO. 59**

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**First published in 2020**

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*This study is based on a research project sponsored by the Indian Council of  
Social Science Research (ICSSR)*

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## **Note from the Author**

The study on which this article is based is entitled 'Delimiting the Northern Frontiers of British India: A Study of Colonial India's Border Making Project vis-à-vis China (1890-1947)'. It was sponsored by the Indian Council of Social Science Research.

I was very ably assisted in guiding and supervising this research programme by Ambassador Vijay K Nambiar who was the Co-Project Director.

Lead researchers were Dr. Nirmola Sharma, Research Associate, and, Mr. Thejalhoukho Casavi, Research Assistant. They were assisted by a group of young scholars on short-term basis. These researchers spent many useful hours poring over archival material in a large number of institutes: Assam State Archives(ASA), Guwahati; Arunachal Pradesh State Archives (APSA), Itanagar; Sikkim State Archives (SSA) and Namgyal Institute of Tibetology, Gangtok; West Bengal State Archives(WBSA), Calcutta; Leh Archives Repository, Leh and, above all, the National Archives of India (NAI), New Delhi.

## **A Study of Colonial India's Border Making Project vis-à-vis China (1890-1947)**

### **Abstract**

*This Occasional Paper is based on a research project which looked at various aspects of how the British colonial rulers addressed the issue of defining India's border with China from 1890 to their departure in 1947. Independent India inherited the boundaries of the British Raj as they existed on 14 August 1947 and so it is useful to see how the British reached what was to become a somewhat troubled legacy.*

## **A Study of Colonial India's Border Making Project vis-à-vis China (1890-1947)**

Over the period that they ruled India different British rulers had fluctuating objectives when it came to deciding the northern borders of India with China. All of them were concerned about British interests but often with widely differing perceptions. The authorities in England often differed from those in India. And in London, often the India Office found itself at odds with the Foreign Office. In India, the men nearer the frontier often disagreed with the central authorities. Successive Governors-General all too often had dissimilar assessments and different priorities. Some like Curzon were determined empire builders; others were more concerned about avoiding increased financial burden. To complicate matters further, the British diplomats posted in China, like Ernest Satow and John Jordan were often strongly influenced by what may be called 'localitis', overwhelmingly concerned about maintaining good relations with China, with a view *inter alia* to protecting British commercial interests. George MaCartney who served for long as the British Representative in Kashgar was quite obviously a strong champion of the Chinese cause.

Though our study concentrated on the period 1890-1947, a certain amount of going further back in time was essential to have a proper historical perspective. It is not surprising that when the East India Company first took control of Indian territory they had no concept of where lay the northern frontiers of the mighty empire they would eventually bequeath to the British Crown. However, by the time this unusual company, which had become more a political master of this expanding area than a commercial entity, had finished its rule, it had begun a serious attempt to identify a boundary dividing parts of its directly-controlled territory, and that of its Indian protégés, from what was under the rule of China and Tibet. Already Warren Hastings the very first Governor-General had recognized the political importance of Tibet. George Bogle and Turner became the first to be sent by him on missions to Tibet. Several intelligent Indians who came to be called 'pundits' were inserted into Tibet on fact-collecting missions. Some of them like Nain Singh acquired a tremendous reputation because of their contribution.<sup>1</sup>

The knowledge accumulated by the "Pundits" formed the basis for future systematic explorations by British officers in the frontier areas notably F.M. Bailey, F. Ludlow, G.S. Lightfoot, George

Sherriff, Captain Dundas etc. in the North-east and their equally determined information seekers in the North-west like Moorecroft, Johnson, Montgomerie, Wellby, Carey etc.

Being heirs to the Age of Enlightenment, the British believed in the latest scientific methods and precision as evidenced by the setting up of Survey of India as early 1767 which makes it the earliest scientific body of Government of India. It was assisted by the Great Trigonometrical Survey, set up in early nineteenth century. Among their tasks was to map the frontiers. With their background, they took for granted the need for a clearly defined linear boundary. They did not share the approach of their Indian predecessors regarding frontier regions according to which often their territory gradually gave way to that of the other, with occasionally a no-man's land in between. There were some easily identifiable physical points which were generally accepted as dividing the two regimes and this was usually a workable arrangement except when disturbed by ambitions of one or other ruler.

Dorothy Woodman makes special reference to the work of Lt. T.G. Montgomerie of the Royal Engineers, a brilliant triangulator, who worked in Kashmir's frontier regions in mid-nineteenth century. To quote Woodman, "Montgomerie and his successors were continually on the alert for any evidence of existing boundary posts between India and China. By telling the story of selected places, it is possible to show how often they endorse Indian statements that there was a customary and traditional frontier. Long before 1846 which we may take as the beginning of British rule in these frontier regions, Indian and Chinese traders had their own methods of deciding where the writ of one country began and where that of the other ended..."<sup>2</sup> It is sometimes forgotten what extraordinarily difficult conditions the original surveyors worked in. They had to operate in heights they had never encountered before. They were working under such huge logistical constraints as the sheer weight of the great theodolite, which was 458kg in 1850s to about 18kg today! And in the Eastern sector they had to traverse through sometimes hostile tribal communities.

With the beginning of the 'Great Game' with Russia in the 1830s, the British assigned increasing strategic importance to frontier areas. Moreover, with the rapid expansion of the British territory

to the north, there was growing concern to locate its precise frontiers as well as to seek orderly political and economic relationships with their neighbours.

One of the great challenges was how to deal with the Chinese and Tibetans. Their cooperation was necessary because a firm boundary requires concurrence of both the parties on its either side. There was the classic instance of the correspondence in 1846-47 between Sir John Davis, the British Governor of Hong Kong, acting on behalf of the Governor General in India, and the Chinese Imperial Commissioner Keying in Canton when the English sought to invite the Chinese government to send officials to join their British counterparts to determine the exact location of the boundary in Ladakh. The technique of Chinese stonewalling included the claim that “the border of the territories has been sufficiently and distinctly fixed, and that it will be best to adhere to this ancient arrangement and it will prove far more convenient to abstain from any additional measures for fixing these.” [Keying to Davis, 13 January 1847.]

Equally interesting is Davis’ response

“... With regard to frontiers, it was surely not to fix any new boundary but merely to ascertain the old ones.... If the British government in India were not to be informed of the ancient boundaries, it would not be possible to prevent mistakes and encroachments. Your Excellency, by expressing that it was intended to fix new boundaries instead of ascertaining the ancient ones has entirely misapprehended the object of H.E. the Governor General...” [ 21 Jan, 1847]

Significantly, this exchange indicates that the British and the Chinese shared the belief that there was a generally recognized traditional boundary, and that the British wanted to demarcate it with the Chinese.

It can be assumed that one of the reasons why the Chinese were unwilling to discuss the question of frontier with the British was their experience of dealing with them while negotiating the 1842 Treaty of Nanking which ended the notorious Opium War.

In 1865, William Johnson, an officer of the Trigonometrical Survey of India after extensive surveys in the Aksai Chin area, proposed that Kashmir should include the area till the Kuen Lun



mountain range and hence according to him Aksai Chin fell within the territory of Kashmir and thereby British India. Johnson's proposition was put forward to the Government of India by Sir John Ardagh in 1897, who had charge of the Intelligence Division of War Office in 1896-98, as a possible boundary line.<sup>3</sup>

In contrast, some other British officials thought that China would provide a suitable buffer against the Russian advance by occupying Aksai China which they saw as a 'No man's land.' This was, for instance, the position of Lord Lansdowne, who was the Viceroy during 1888-94. John Ardagh, had no such illusions, particularly after China succumbed to Japan in the 1895 Sino-Japanese War and the impact of the Boxer troubles in 1900. He was quite clear that the Kuen Lun Range provided a strategically sensible frontier against Russian expansionism.

Over-riding Johnson's cartography and Ardagh's strategic consideration, Britain proposed another modified boundary line to China, which is incorporated in the note which Sir Claude MacDonald, the British Ambassador to China submitted to China's Foreign Office on 14 March 1899 and which is popularly known as the MacDonald-Macartney line. The new line ran:

“From the Karakorum Pass the crests of the range run nearly east for about half a degree, and then turn south to a little below the 35th parallel of North Latitude. Rounding them what in our maps is shown as the source of the Karakash, the line of hills to be followed runs north-east to a point east of Kizil Jilga and from there, in a south-easterly direction, follows the Lak Tsung Range until that meets the spur running south from the Kuen Lun Range which has hitherto been shown on our maps as the eastern boundary of Ladakh. This is a little east of 80° East Longitude.”

There has been some controversy about the Lak Tsung Range. G.N.Rao, who was an Advisor to the Indian delegation at the Officials' Talks in 1960, feels that there is no such thing<sup>4</sup>. But Lamb, conceding that the mountains here are not so dramatic as elsewhere in the Karakoram, points out that the excellent photographs made available by NASA confirm the belief that a range of some kind exists here which would be easily made out on the ground.<sup>5</sup>

The same unwillingness to tie themselves down to a precise agreement with the British which the Chinese displayed in the Davis-Keying correspondence occurred when there was no response to this very generous offer made by the British in 1899 which would have presented Aksai Chin to China. It is worth noting that in doing so the British Government was ignoring the claims of Kashmir. It seemed to be motivated solely by its perception of British strategic interests in dealing with Russia.

Later, other British officials appear to have been relieved that the Chinese did not accept this offer. Many argued that the Chinese silence meant that the offer was no longer on the table. Some clearly preferred the Johnson-Ardagh line. Viceroy Hardinge, on September 1912, wrote to the Secretary of State for India that if negotiations take place with Russia, then a boundary line placing Aksai Chin within the British territory should be recognised as a preliminary to negotiations. He noted that this object will be obtained by a line similar to that proposed by Ardagh. This reversion to the Ardagh alignment was linked to the 1911 revolution in China and the resulting instability in the outlying regions of the new Chinese republic. Though this now seemed to have become the assumed frontier this sector remained unsettled all the way to 1947. Indeed, for a short period of time Prime Minister Nehru was willing to make a distinction between this area and the North-East. Speaking in a debate in the Lok Sabha on September 12, 1959, he said, “this place, Aksai China area, is in our maps undoubtedly. But I distinguish it completely from other areas. It is a matter of argument as to what part of it belongs to us and what part of it belongs to somebody else. It is not at all a dead clear matter. ... . It has been in challenge all the time.’ However, the Kongka Pass incident, where the Chinese killed 9 personnel of the Indo-Tibetan force in October 1959, put an end to this flexibility.<sup>6</sup>

One of the relevant issues that remained unresolved throughout the British rule was the precise nature of the relationship between China and Tibet. China ‘s approach was basically that of a colonial power. One is tempted to say that this resembled France’s approach to her colonies which it treated as parts of France. Tibetans, on the other hand, naturally preferred to be treated as an independent entity though there were periods when they could not ignore China’s imperial power and claims. The British remained ambivalent through much of the period under review. Keen to find a formula which met the minimum demands of Tibet, China and their own interests,

the British decided to use the flexible concept of ‘suzerainty’ on which we shall we more to say later in this paper.

There were dramatically conflicting views on the subject among various British authorities. The local officers, expressed scepticism on the question of Chinese power over Tibet and were impatient over the Government’s decision to respect Chinese sensitivities in Tibet. An 1888 communication from H.M. Durand, the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, shows how the Bengal government sided with the local authorities. But ignoring their eminently realistic assessment, the British Government decided to go over the heads of Tibet and signed a treaty relating to Sikkim-Tibet border and trade directly with China in 1890. This attitude of the central Government and the office at London can be better understood when we take into consideration the developments in other parts of the Empire. The expansionism of Russia in Central Asia was a major concern to the British Empire and it was during the same period that Britain was attempting to set up China as a buffer against further Russian advances towards British India.

The Tibetans showed their unhappiness by destroying whatever pillars the British put up in the attempt to demarcate the border as defined in the Treaty. The Sino-British understanding on trade in the Tibet was also rendered infructuous by Tibetan defiance. It is important to note that from mid-1890s an adult Dalai Lama had taken charge in Lhasa after almost a century and this encouraged Tibetans to assert their independence.<sup>7</sup>

It was the British perception of increasing Tibetan obstreperousness and the Chinese inability to exercise any control over them despite their pretensions to the contrary that led to the Younghusband expedition to Lhasa in 1904 under the determined Viceroy Lord Curzon.

Here too, we suddenly come across the Great Game with the machinations of Dorjjeff. In a letter to the Viceroy of India, dated 2<sup>nd</sup> November 1900, the Secretary of State reported that the journal of St Petersburg carried an article on 15<sup>th</sup> October which mentioned the reception by the Emperor of someone by the name Dorjeiff as some sort of an envoy of the Dalai Lama. Younghusband would later claim that this was one of the major reasons behind the renewed emphasis on sending a British mission to Lhasa. It was a clear indication, Younghusband argued, that while the Dalai Lama refused to enter into any communication with the British, he had sent a mission to the Czar

of Russia. However, after a period of correspondences between the two governments, Russia assured the British that she had no designs or political motives in Tibet. While London seemed satisfied with Russia's assurance, as far as Viceroy Curzon was concerned, it only strengthened his resolve, for he had long been convinced of the Russian threat to the British empire.

The Government in London was not supportive of Curzon's aggressive policy but it accepted his proposal to send a trade mission. Instead the mission under the intrepid Francis Younghusband became a military expedition all the way to Lhasa, after violent suppression of Tibetan resistance. Reversing the 1890 policy, the Lhasa Convention which Younghusband signed on behalf of the British government on 7<sup>th</sup> September 1904 was not with China but between the Government of Great Britain and the Government of Tibet. The first article of the treaty stated Tibetan acknowledgement of the Anglo-China Convention of 1890 and the boundary as defined by that Convention. An exorbitant indemnity was to be paid and the Chumbi valley would be occupied till the indemnity was paid.

The issue of the complicated nature of Chinese authority in Tibet did not reach any resolution with the Lhasa Convention. While this Convention secured for Britain a strong footing in Tibet, the British Home government was not impressed with what was seen as the high handedness of Younghusband's action. It was therefore felt that an 'adhesion' treaty should be signed with China to secure Chinese acknowledgement of the treaty.

In the negotiations for this Adhesion Treaty, the Chinese insisted on being Tibet's 'sovereign' while British persisted on the concept of 'suzerainty' with Tibet enjoying a fair amount of autonomy. According to Lamb, it was the Indian Foreign Secretary, S.M. Fraser, representative of the Indian side in these negotiations, who was the first to advance what was in the language of Anglo-Chinese diplomacy, an essentially new argument: Tibet was not like the rest of China; the Chinese were suzerain in Tibet, not sovereign. Lamb goes on to add, 'Quite what this meant was not clear. The implication, however, was that the Chinese position in Tibet was more ceremonial than effective, and that in the day-to-day conduct of affairs the Tibetan enjoyed considerable degree of autonomy. Perhaps the analogy might be with the kind of the position the British had vis-à-vis Canada or Australia...'<sup>8</sup> Finally the Adhesion Treaty was signed without this issue

being resolved. One wonders whether this was an instance of British strategic hypocrisy', as Dibyesh Anand calls it.<sup>9</sup>

In the meanwhile, the British Government in London, in pursuit of its larger strategic interests, took another diplomatic step which weakened their hands vis-à-vis China with respect to Tibet, the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. The second article of the Convention read:

“In conformity with the admitted principle of the suzerainty of China over Tibet, Great Britain and Russia engage not to enter into negotiations with Tibet except through the intermediary of the Chinese Government.”

Naturally China was keen to take full advantage of this development. From their point of view the ideal situation would be to completely sabotage whatever degree of autonomy Tibet enjoyed and convert it into a normal Chinese province.

But the Chinese pretensions took a massive blow in 1911-1912 when the Qing dynasty was overthrown and a republic established, coinciding with the Chinese being thrown out of Lhasa by the Tibetans. Tibet became, for all practical purposes, an independent entity. However, Yuan Shih-kai, the first President of the Republic of China, insisted on the theory of *Wu-zu* and the formal Qing abdication edict expressed “the hope that the ‘territories of the five ethnic groups [*wuzu*]—Manchu, Mongol, Han, Muslim, and Tibetan!—would unite to form one great Republic of China.” The Tibetans ignored this with contempt and indeed the British were able to invite them to the Simla conference with their representative invested with same plenipotentiary powers as his Chinese counterpart!

Our researchers with the help of archival material have looked at the process by which the British moved slowly from the foothills in Assam up to what was to become the McMahon Line in Simla. The British gained a foothold into the Northeast after they defeated the Burmese at the Anglo-Burmese War of 1824. This event brought them in direct contact with the numerous tribes who lived in this region. Initially the British adopted a conciliatory attitude towards these border tribes. Whenever tribals were perceived as causing trouble, they were overpowered by despatch of small punitive expeditions or placated by the payment of annual *posa*, a practice going back to

Ahom days. With the discovery of new commercial and potentially profitable interests in the region, there also arose the need to protect these interests from the frontier tribes.

The local British authorities had particular trouble with the Abor tribe. Assam government had been recommending strong measures against the Abors. The proposals were rejected by Whitehall citing the reason that they did not have enough information on these tribes. But the murder in 1911 of Williamson, a British officer posted in Sadiya, compelled London to authorise the Abor Expedition.

Incidentally, the fateful trip during which Williamson and party were killed had not received official sanction. They had, on their own volition, embarked on a mission to explore the extent of Tibetan and Chinese influence. These villages were located outside the Outer Line [which marked the limit of British administration and not the international border]<sup>10</sup>. Williamson was aware that sanction would not come readily from the Government to cross the Outer Line to visit the villages, hence the visit was undertaken without the knowledge of the Government of India. He had already conducted a private tour of the area during which he discovered the widespread nature of Chinese activities in the frontier beyond the Outer Line. When pressing for the despatch of the Abor mission, the Assam Government had tied the question of punishing the rebellious Abors to that of increase in Chinese activities in the Northeast Frontier.

Williamson in his reports to the Government of India, after his earlier tours of the villages in the frontier areas, had proactively and frequently alluded to Chinese activities in the region. In 1909 he had toured the Mishmi area all the way to Walong and had reported extensively on the extent of Chinese activities and advocated that measures should be taken to thwart Chinese designs. He was the one who reported the finding of the Chinese boundary cairns in Menilkrai, a place which was located south of what was to become the McMahon Line. Assam lauded Williamson's actions as those of a "brave and zealous officer who was willing to risk his life and the possible displeasure of Government to obtain information which he knew to be of the highest value" for the Government of India "in the future determination of a suitable boundary between India and Chinese possessions." The Assam Government thus pointed out that the 'China factor' could no

longer be overlooked or downplayed, especially when a party of faithful British officers had lost their lives in ascertaining the magnitude of Chinese activities. There had been reports of Chinese activities elsewhere as well.

The relevant archival material makes it clear that as of 1910 India Office in London was still reluctant to adopt any major new policy. It ordered this question as well as the general question of policy to be held over until the new Viceroy Hardinge took over. Hardinge's position was different from that of his predecessor Minto. His views were more in line with London. He viewed that the Government of India was not yet ready to extend its responsibilities on the frontier. The Assam Government was eventually informed that despite Government of India being aware of the possibility that the action of the Chinese might ultimately compel them to fix a line beyond the Outer Line, they would wait and assess the situation. There seemed to be no urgent necessity for incurring the risks and responsibilities entailed by a forward movement into the tribal area. Accordingly, the solution prescribed was that the Lieutenant Governor of Assam should instruct its frontier officers that henceforth they should confine themselves to "cultivating friendly relations with the tribes beyond the Outer Line" and if needed punish them for acts of hostility committed within the limits of British influence.

Incidentally, Parshotam Mehra,<sup>11</sup> draws our attention to some relevant diplomatic activity at this time. In December 1910, the Chinese had protested against British activity and demanded a joint delimitation of the frontier. The British replied that no such delimitation could be agreed without acceptance of the watershed principle which apparently had been put forward in a note presented to the Chinese by Ernest Satow already in 1906. Peking refused to accept the watershed principle, saying it would involve surrendering Chinese territory.

London and the Government of India were still cautious about dealing with the looming Chinese threat. But gradually a change took place. Chinese troops had reached Rima bordering Assam in 1911 from where they expelled all the Tibetan officials. They erected a post at Menilkrai, at a point three miles south of Walong, claiming it to be the southern boundary of the Qing empire and there were reports of Chinese soldiers visiting the Mishmi country on the British side of the territory. The Government of India argued that the 'China' factor could no longer be overlooked

or downplayed in formulating a frontier tribal policy as well as on the other related and important question of the location of boundary and the need for more exploration and surveys in the tribal hinterland for this purpose. There was a clear cut instruction from the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department to Major-General H.Bower, commanding the expedition, "If such officials ( Chinese officials or troops) be met within the territory of tribes on this side of the recognized Tibetan-Chinese limits, they should be invited to withdraw and if necessary compelled to do so."<sup>12</sup>

‘The despatch of the Abor expedition, apart from the primary task of punishing the Abors, thus can be seen to have concerned with three important questions in the face of a Chinese threat:

- a. Frontier tribe policy
- b. Survey and exploration
- c. The question of boundary.

It is also worth noting that about this time Britain became alive to the geopolitical ramifications of Qing military advances in Tibet on the Himalayan states of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan. There was the fear that the continuance of Chinese military might in Tibet would affect its prestige *vis-à-vis* these Himalayan kingdoms. Jordan had conveyed British concerns to Beijing reiterating that Britain could not "allow any administrative changes in Tibet to affect or prejudice the integrity of Nepal or of the two smaller states of Bhutan and Sikkim and that they are prepared, if necessary, to protect the interest and rights of these three States." A new treaty, the Punakha treaty, had been concluded with Bhutan in 1910 by which Britain assumed control of Bhutan’s foreign relations while guaranteeing non-interference in internal affairs. According to Charles Bell who had negotiated this treaty, it was meant to counter and check Chinese influence.

Faced with the Chinese threat securing a sound ‘strategical’ frontier became the main object of the British policy. While still not clear about the actual frontier line to be aimed at there was one general guiding principle: to correctly identify the locally recognised limit of Tibetan territory while at the same time identifying such prominent physical features as were essential for a strategic and well-defined boundary line. The military experts recommended the principal watershed, indeed ideally they would have preferred it to be on the other side of the watershed but they knew that it was impractical.



Simultaneously Indian government suggested that, on the one hand there should be loose political control between the 'administered' boundary and the new external boundary, and on the other authorisation of effective steps to prevent violation of the new external by the Chinese. The feeling had grown in the government that the action of Chinese seemed to indicate "a desire on their part to peg out claims, which, if not immediately countered, may hereafter be troublesome to refute. And London's perpetual concern about the expenditure involved was met with the argument that these steps were necessary for the defence of the large English population and investment in East Bengal and Assam.

The surveyors attached to the expedition were instructed to take into account such prominently marked physical features which would account for a "satisfactory strategic and well-defined boundary line" for British India. In July 1911, the Government consented to the proposal and desired that early steps are to be taken to prevent further encroachments by the Chinese. Chinese activities in the China-Burma frontier had also disturbed the British Government.

On 21<sup>st</sup> September 1911 Lord Hardinge made a strong clear statement of policy:

"endeavours should be made to secure as soon as possible a sound strategical boundary between China-cum-Tibet and the tribal territory from Bhutan up to and including the Mishmi country and this should be, we consider, now be the main object of our policy.... With the recent change in conditions, the question of a boundary well-defined and at a safer distance from our administered border has become one of imperative importance and admits of no delay..."

"On the question of erection of boundary markers, Government of India submitted that they had no objection to the erection of cairns and boundary stones by the survey party on what could be considered a suitable frontier line for India, since this would 'greatly strengthen our position in the event of future negotiations with China for frontier demarcation.'"13

Justifying the sending of an exploration party to the Northeastern Frontier, one of the officers, A.H. Gordon, emphasized:

“experience in Tibet and Burma has shown that the Chinese are difficult to deal with where boundaries are concerned, and so that there may be some basis of negotiation it seems desirable that our surveyors should be allowed to press forward, and so take advantage of the present position in China to secure British interests in regions where they have hitherto been somewhat overlooked owing to their remoteness and inaccessibility.”<sup>14</sup>

As is to be expected, our study devoted a lot of attention to the Simla Conference. One of the controversial questions is whether Tibet had the authority to sign the Convention independently of China. As we have seen above the precise nature of the China-Tibet equation had always haunted British relations with Tibet which became acutely felt from the late nineteenth century onwards. When Britain insisted on a tripartite agreement, with the Tibetan Government representing itself independently, for the Simla Convention in 1913, it was hardly a novel policy. The bitter experiences of negotiating with China for Tibetan affairs since 1890 had convinced the British Government that the Tibetan Government must be party to any arrangement relating to Tibet. The eviction of any meaningful Chinese presence from Tibet as an aftermath of the 1911 revolution in China, meant that Tibet was for all practical purposes independent. Though British found that they could not go to the extent of acknowledging Tibet's independence formally, they ensured that the concept of Tibetan autonomy included the right to send a representative as a plenipotentiary on the same level as his British and Chinese counterparts and hence having the legal right to negotiate Indo-Tibetan boundary directly with the British.

All unbiased studies of the Chinese attitude at the Simla Conference and for many years after that have shown that the Chinese refusal to sign the Convention was exclusively because of the McMahon's Inner-Outer Tibet conceptualization [shown in the map by the blue line] and had nothing to do the Indo-Tibetan boundary negotiated bilaterally by McMahon [ably assisted by Charles Bell] and Lonchen Shatra, the Tibetan plenipotentiary, a man of as outstanding ability as his Chinese counterpart, Ivan Chen.

*The China Year Book 1921-22* carries an authoritative Chinese statement on the entire proceedings at Simla. This little noticed document has been reproduced in full as Appendix 18 in A.G.Noorani's *India-China Boundary Problem Inter alia* the document says.

“China, dissatisfied with the suggested division into an Inner and Outer Tibet the boundaries of which would involve the evacuation of those districts actually in Chinese effective occupation and under its administration, though otherwise in accord with the general principles of the draft Convention, declared that the initialled draft was in no way binding on her.....”

In the map showing Indo-Tibetan boundary which he presented to Lonchen Shatra, McMahon did not draw the line arbitrarily. The British Indian government now had fairly detailed surveys as far as the cartographic techniques then available made possible. But the cartographers had themselves worked on some principles. The ideal strategic boundary was identified as the watershed. Discussions with the tribals had suggested that in most places this would indeed be the old boundary respected also by Tibetans. Tawang presented a major problem. This was finally resolved by giving Tibet some areas valuable to them for religious reasons in exchange. Incidentally, given the nature of the terrain, the line was not defined in the text; it was solely indicated on the agreed map by a thick nib dipped in red ink. It is a significant point mentioned by more than one scholar that the Line in both the maps was identical: the one attached in the initialled Convention initialled by Ivan Chen, and the other attached to the notes exchanged between the British and Tibetans.<sup>15</sup>

The British Government authorised its mission in Moscow to explain the rationale behind McMahon line to Russians in the following terms if the latter raised any objection,

“An accurate definition of the frontier has only become possible during the last few months in consequence of the survey work undertaken in the tribal territory, that the line chosen follows the main geographical features *approximating to the traditional border* [emphasis added] between Tibet and the semi-independent tribes under the control of the Government of India, and that, as far as possible, it

divides exactly the territory occupied by people of Tibetan origin from that inhabited by the Miris, Abors and other tribes within the British sphere of influence.”

Woodman says that the area between the Outer Line and the McMahon Line approximates to what the Chinese claimed in 1959. While it is true, Woodman goes on to add, that the British gradually extended their rule to what became the McMahon Line, it is not true, as the Chinese claim today, that this area was under their rule, or with the exception of part of the Tawang tract, even under that of Tibet.

The Sino-Tibetan problem continued with the Chinese endeavours to reopen the Simla Conference. This became an occasion to bring into bold relief dramatically different attitudes of various British officials on this issue. *Inter alia* Chinese demands of 1919 provided for a larger slice of Tibetan territory to China than that had been agreed upon in 1914. But Jordan, the British representative in Peking, saw the Chinese offer as a golden opportunity to settle the Tibetan question. He argued that the discussions would be fruitful only if it were a Sino-British bilateral one. He firmly advised his Government to communicate with Tibet only after the final agreement was drafted.

In contrast, we have C.A. Bell, who of all the British officials was closest to the Tibetan ruling elite, especially the Dalai Lama. He was quite clear that any negotiations on Tibet must have a Tibetan representative. To underscore his arguments, Bell pointed out to his Government that “it was Britain’s duty to assist the Tibetans to achieve liberation from China...” His position was equally and deeply rooted in the geopolitical needs of Britain. He argued that Britain needed Tibet as a buffer on the north.

The issue of Tawang continues to be a major hurdle towards solution of Sino-Indian border dispute. As we have noted it had become part of British territory through the Indo-Tibetan bilateral agreement signed by McMahon and Lonchen. Tibet had agreed to swap Tawang with the sacred places Tso Karpo and Tso Sari. According to the boundary line, which McMahon had

defined and had been agreed upon by the Tibetan Government, Tawang was thus included south of the McMahon Line. On including Tawang within Indian territory, McMahon had noted:

“In defining the new Indo-Tibet boundary the wedge of country to the east of Bhutan, which is known as Tawang has been included in British territory. This secures to us a natural watershed frontier, access to the shortest trade route into Tibet, and control of the monastery of Tawang”.

Unfortunately, in the years after the Conference, hardly any information was made public about where the McMahon line was drawn and no clarity on whether it should be printed in official maps or not. This unfortunate inattentiveness to the question of the McMahon Line was to continue for almost two decades. Four different reasons, not all of them operating at the same time, could explain what seems inexplicable at first sight:

- i. London, in the immediate aftermath of the culmination of the Conference, had not been very keen on publishing the text of the Convention without any formal discussion with Russia on the matter. Concerns over Russian reaction was to determine London's position until the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917.
- ii. It was a British hope that the Chinese would eventually come around and sign the Simla Convention.
- iii. The First World War followed immediately after the Simla Conference. The War and its consequences ensured that the McMahon line became a relatively trivial issue for the British authorities in London and Delhi.
- iv. In the years that followed London became increasingly concerned about the anti-British propaganda in China, initially largely by the anti-imperialist May Fourth Chinese voices and gradually stoked by the Japanese for their own political purpose making British actions in Tibet appear much worse than what they themselves were doing in Shantung.<sup>16</sup>

The proceedings of the Conference at Simla and the Convention did not find any mention in *Aitchison's Collections of Engagements, Treaties and Sanads*, the official records of treaties relating to India and neighbouring countries until 1938.

What brought the British bureaucracy out of its slumber was the 1935 F. Kingdon-Ward incident when this botanist was arrested by the Tibetans for allegedly crossing into Tibet without permission. It led to the embarrassing realization that thanks to this non-publication of the 1914 settlement even the Assam government was ignorant of the boundary. Further Kingdon-Ward had found that Tibet was administering areas deep beyond the McMahon Line.

The report of the incident caught the attention of Olaf Caroe, who was then a Deputy Secretary. He asked for all the documents available on the boundary agreement between Lonchen and McMahon. After assiduously studying and scrutinising the documents, he had “unearthed the true position” of the McMahon Line, Caroe wrote back to the Political Officer, Sikkim, who was responsible for Tibetan affairs:

“international frontier between India and Tibet east of Bhutan...was defined by Red Line on map drawn by McMahon and accepted by Tibetan Government in accordance with article IX of 1914 Convention. This line lies well north at Tawang and it is not understood why Tibetans maintain Dzongpon at Tawang who grants authority to enter Tibet”

He made a compelling case for publishing McMahon’s boundary agreement with Tibet and showing the Red Line in the official maps of India. He pointed out that the body of officers to whom the international position in the North-east frontier was known was a small one and it seemed that there ‘was a real danger that important matters of this kind may go wrong if we refrain any longer from publishing our agreements with Tibet’. As a matter of fact, failure to communicate the original perfectly legitimate Anglo-Tibetan agreement to all departments did lead to all sorts of confusion which was later happily exploited by China and its supporters.

And so, on 9 April 1936, Delhi sought the permission of Whitehall to publish the 1914 agreement and to rectify the maps to show the correct frontier. Permission was given but they were instructed to do so without any fanfare to minimize adverse Chinese reaction.

The British silence on the McMahon line for so long has given rise to all sorts of baseless conspiracy theories. These were buttressed by the clumsy British efforts to pass the volume of XIV of Aitchison as 1927 edition though it was actually published in 1937. That there was no intention to conceal the McMahon Line agreement is obvious from the fact that it was clearly shown as the frontier between India and Tibet in Charles Bell's book *Tibet, Past and Present*, which was published in 1924 after being vetted by the India Office.

In 1936, the Kashag, the governing council of Tibet, argued that Tibet would respect the boundary agreement in the Northeast Frontier if Britain helped them to work out an acceptable solution with the Chinese. They implied that the boundary agreement was not a stand-alone agreement but dependent on the resolution of Sino-Tibetan conflict. On the question of Tawang, the Kashag announced that Tawang "had undoubtedly been Tibetan" until 1914. Though Tawang was ceded to India, the Kashag said that Tibet was of the belief that Britain would not act upon it because, "at no time since the Convention and Declaration of 1914 had the Indian Government taken steps to question Tibetan, or assert British, authority in the Tawang area."

In 1938, finally, Captain G.S. Lightfoot, Political Officer of the Balipara Frontier Tract was sent on a tour to Tawang. The Chief Secretary of Assam advised Lightfoot to carry out the expedition with extreme caution. He said,

"There is, of course, no possible doubt that the Indo-Tibetan boundary was definitely determined; and I am to ask you to be scrupulously careful to give no impression that the matter can be reopened. Your presence with an escort in Tawang will in itself be an assertion of British authority, but your conduct in all things should be such as may be calculated to cause least shock to Tibetan susceptibilities."

Captain Lightfoot after his tour of the area submitted a detailed report in September 1938. In his report, he spoke of the brutalities and oppression of the Monpas who inhabit the Tawang area by the Tibetan officials. He therefore advised that the Tibetan Government should be asked to withdraw their officials and British officials take over the administration.

Britain's interest in affirming its authority in the Northeast proved short-lived. They once again refused to take lasting measures citing that due to war cloud hovering over Europe and Asia, they could not sanction the huge expenses that would be incurred in affecting administrative control over Tawang. Moreover, Britain did not wish to "endanger the friendly relations" with the Tibetan Government" and it was decided to drop the matter.

In an interesting turn of events, China increasingly sought to leverage its newfound position as one of the Allies, to gain favorable world opinion on the Tibetan issue. In Chinese propaganda measures, Tibet came to be increasingly depicted and publicised as part of China. In the maps and the pamphlets which were published by the Chinese Ministry of Information, Tibet was "persistently" delineated as a province of China. The final blow was the publication of Chiang Kai-shek's revised version of "*China's Destiny*" in which he posited that the five races- Hans, Manchus, Mongols, Muslims and the Tibetans have common ancestral origin. This incensed Britain saw this "falsification of history" as "justification of a policy of economic, cultural and political assimilation of the border peoples" including the Tibetans. Unfortunately, some British officials like Gould, P.O in Sikkim, and Mills, Advisor to the Assam Governor, keen to secure Tibetan cooperation were willing to return Tawang as earlier another set of British officials had happily offered Aksai Chin to China. Fortunately, this did not happen in case of Tawang.

In 1943, with the sanction of the Secretary of State and the General Staff, the Government of India decided to undertake aerial surveys of the tribal areas between the administrative northern frontier of Assam and the McMahon Line to "re-assert" Britain's authority and influence in the area up to the "agreed boundary between India and Tibet." As part of the project, it attempted to survey, photograph and map the area which had been left unsurveyed in the area.<sup>17</sup> By March, 1945, the Survey of India, with the help of the Royal Air Force had completed substantial aerial photographic reconnaissance of the area.

To ensure a comprehensive coverage of our subject , it was also necessary to look at the 'Middle' sector. Few studies on the subject have looked at this sector with as close a scrutiny of archival material as our team of young researchers. They first looked at the dispute between the Kashmir Durbar and Tibetan Government over Dokpo Karpo.



The Kashmir Durbar asserted that Dokpo Karpo was in Ladakh and, therefore, within its territorial limits. The Tibetan Government claimed that Dokpo Karpo was part of Rudok in Tibet, and hence it should be restored to Tibet with immediate effect. To solve the impasse, the Government of India decided to convene a meeting between the representatives of the Kashmir Durbar, Tibetan Government, and Government of India. The succeeding negotiations failed to resolve the issue with each side insisting on a different version of the traditional boundary.

The problem continued to fester. As late as in 1940, the Wazir of Ladakh reported to the Kashmir Government of the regular ingress of Tibetan soldiers from Gartok into Dokpo Karpo and in the village of Rupsho, extracting money and demanding return of their subjects who had immigrated to Ladakh and had settled there for several generations.<sup>18</sup>

Confrontations between the Kashmir Durbar officials and the Tibetan frontier officials continued throughout the period of study. There were recurrent reports of the entry of Tibetan officials into Kashmiri territory and vice-versa. Apparently, the Government of India also had a strategic interest in letting the problem remain unsolved for the “reestablishment of such relations should not affect” her “control” over the native States and the “advantages to be gained.”<sup>19</sup>

Better known are the disputes with Tibet over Bara Hoti and Nelang-Jadhang in the present day Uttarakhand. The Tibetan post at Bara Hoti kept on appearing every year after late 1880s. The local authorities suggested that the Government of India lodge an official protest with the Tibetan authorities against this annual intrusion of their subjects on British territory and that, if disregarded by Tibet then, Government of India could take action to eject them. One of the officers of the United Provinces and Oudh prognosticated an outcome which was to take place almost seven decades later. He said,

“...the Tibetans come in and assert a claim to a territory and behind them come the Chinese and support this claim on their own account, no matter how preposterous it is, and a troublesome international question arises. The way to obviate the greater difficulty is obviously to nip the smaller one in the bud.”

The Government of India replied in a nonchalant tone observing that “the annual intrusion of a few Tibetans in this neighbourhood had always been regarded as a matter to which should be given as little international importance as possible and that there was still no sufficient reason for lodging a protest with the Tibetan authorities on the subject.”<sup>20</sup> At the same time, the Government of India, highlighted that the economic implications of sending up a small detachment of police up to Bara Hoti would be high. It was not ready to act upon an expensive undertaking as yet.

Further, in 1913, when the issue was raised, Britain was preparing for the Tripartite Convention in Simla and did not want to “estrangle Tibet at a time when delicate negotiations are pending.” It reminded the local Government that Britain was “strong enough, at any moment we choose, to settle the boundary question finally by a small show of force. But the present is a most inopportune moment to select for doing so. The Tibetan intrusion on this side is causing little or no practical inconvenience at present.”<sup>21</sup>

Another bone of contention is Nelang or Nilang in Uttarkashi district. The adjoining villages of Jadhong, Sang, and Pulam Sumda, which falls in the Jadhong valley, are also claimed by China. The villages lie at the border of Uttarakhand -Himachal Pradesh. These places during the colonial period were included in the kingdom of Tehri and had been cause of constant discord between the Tehri state and the Tibetan Government. The Tibetans had been persistent in their claim of the valley and the Tehri Durbar repeatedly referred the matter to the British Government to find a solution to the boundary problem.

On the advice of the Tehri Durbar, the Government of India decided to appoint a boundary commission to look into the dispute. T.J.C. Acton, ICS was chosen to represent the British Government in the negotiations who proposed a compromise solution which Tibet rejected.

In 1932 Frederick Williamson, P. O Sikkim was asked by the Government to visit the disputed area at the end of his tour of Western Tibet. Williamson hinted to the Tibetan Government the possibility of their demands being met was low because, for the last 60 years Tehri had effectively occupied that area and had been in possession of the place. He seemed to have

remarked to the Tibetan Dzungpon that “that practically every frontier in the world is now different from the frontiers of 200 years ago.”<sup>22</sup>

But finally, in keeping with the British willingness to appease Tibet - observers believe that the prospect of a Chinese threat was the primary motivation behind such a shift in British position - Williamson proposed that the entire area excluding the deodar forests in the area be given to Tibet, while Tehri was to be compensated with another area in British territory. The United Provinces Government refused the territory swapping idea of Williamson and accused him of being “biased in favour of Tibet.”

In the next few years of British rule in India, the World War II and the strategic thrust over the vindication of the McMahon Line rendered the problem secondary.

On the eve of transfer of power to independent India, the Foreign Secretary, Hugh Weightman, penned an intriguing note, falling back on old concerns:

“The Chinese have, for years, sought to undermine Tibetan autonomy which His Majesty’s Government and the Government of India have equally consistently sought to uphold. Doubts have been expressed of the continuing importance of Tibet as a northern buffer and it is, I suppose, arguable that an extension of Chinese authority would not present any very serious danger to India. On the other hand history teaches us that any attempt to reassert Chinese authority in Central Asia tends to be followed by a resurgence of Russian interest and influence and sometimes more- and Russian supremacy in Tibet would be very dangerous indeed to India.”

The policy that was bequeathed to independent India was spelled out by L.A.C. Fry, Deputy Secretary, External Affairs Department in a letter dated 8 April 1947 to A.J. Hopkinson, Political Officer in Sikkim. <sup>23</sup> He wrote,

“The Government of India have now reviewed their attitude towards the political relationship between China, Tibet and India. As a result, it has been decided to adopt for the present the following line of policy.

The conditions in which India’s well-being may be assured and the full evolution be achieved of her inherent capacity to emerge as a potent but benevolent force in world affairs-particularly in Asia- demand not merely the development of internal unity and strength but also the maintenance of friendly relations with her neighbours. To prejudice her relations with so important a power as China by aggressive support of unqualified Tibetan independence (for which, whatever may have been the situation earlier, there has in the past year or two been little positive sign of ardour in Lhasa), is therefore a policy with few attractions.

It follows that while the Government of India is glad to recognise and wish to see Tibetan autonomy maintained, they are not prepared to do more than encourage this in a friendly manner and are certainly not disposed to take any initiative which might bring India into conflict with China on this issue. The attitude which they propose to adopt may best be described as that of a benevolent spectator, ready at all times- should opportunity occur-to use their offices to further a mutually satisfactory settlement between China and Tibet....

In regard to the Indo-Tibetan boundary, the Government of India stand by the McMahon Line and will not tolerate incursions into India such as that which recently occurred in the Siang Valley. They would however at all times be prepared to discuss in a friendly way with China and Tibet any rectification of the frontier that might be urged on reasonable grounds by any of the parties of the abortive Simla Conference of 1914.”

### **Summing up**

This Research project has highlighted some important points about the manner in which the British border-making policy evolved over this period

- I. The impact of difference of opinion between the British authorities in England, India and China about what would best serve British interests.
- II. The role played by British India's surveyors in their quest for 'traditional' boundary.
- III. The interplay of multiple factors: trade interests, perception of Russian expansionism, imperial aspirations, concern about Chinese sensitivity etc. Thus, for instance, in London the Foreign Office, obsessed with the Russian factor signed an agreement in 1907 without much foresight about dealing with Tibet only through China.
- IV. The higher British authorities were all too often unwilling to accept sensible recommendations of local authorities for fear of the expenditure involved in moving towards the boundary and administering the relevant area.
- V. The British recognized the importance of Tibet as a buffer but the insistence on Chinese suzerainty with Tibetan autonomy rather than outright recognition of Tibetan independence even after 1911 helped China to claim sovereignty.
- VI. British made sure that Sikkim, Bhutan and Nepal in one way or another came under their influence and not that of China which clearly had aspirations in that direction.
- VII. As far as Ladakh was concerned, the work of Johnson the cartographer and Ardagh, the military strategist, were significant though as far as British government policy was concerned there was an ambivalence including willingness, at one stage, to hand over Aksai Chin to China in the belief that the latter's occupation would deter Russia. Eventually the British failed to secure Chinese concurrence to an agreed boundary in Ladakh but not for want of trying.
- VIII. A critically important move was to ensure that Tibet had the legal right to negotiate what became the McMahon line in the Northeast by insisting that Lonchen Shatra was Tibet's plenipotentiary on same level as his Chinese and British counterparts.
- IX. As far as the Middle Sector was concerned Britain's role had been that of a mediator for the dispute had been primarily between the Kashmir and Tehri State on one side and Tibet [not China] on the other. And in both the cases, negotiations with Tibet proved infructuous and, while the local authorities recommended more stern action, the higher British authorities did not consider the matter of any urgency.

- X. Our study highlights a little-known phenomenon: often Tibet was as much a headache as China starting with refusal to demarcate the 1890 line in the Sikkim-Tibet border, claims in the Middle Sector, intrusions below McMahon Line, renewed claims on Tawang, etc.
- XI. The McMahon line - and the surveys as well as effective movement up to the 'strategic boundary' - keeping the Chinese away, was, in many ways the most important British legacy but this was to some extent weakened by not publishing it for decades and finally doing it in a clumsy fashion. The willingness of some British officers to return Tawang to Tibet further complicated matters.

Finally, it must be recognised that many British officers posted in India worked hard to secure a good boundary for British India. Of course, they had no concept of an independent India. Their goal was to secure a strategically and geographically sound barrier for the British empire against the advance of Russia in the North-west and that of China in the North-East.

A Note on '*The Historical Background of The Himalayan Frontier of India,*' prepared by the Historical Division of the Ministry of External Affairs, published in November 1959 asserted that 'India's northern frontier is a traditional one, in the sense that it has lain approximately where it now runs for nearly 3000 years.' Basically, the same claim was asserted during the 1960 Official level talks. The Indian Report declared that the boundary as claimed by India was 'recognised in tradition and custom for centuries.'

The theory of 'ancient boundaries' has been challenged by international law experts. But this study which makes extensive use of archival material, besides the well-known secondary sources, shows that the concept of 'ancient/traditional boundaries' did play a certain part in the British endeavours to decide India's northern borders, though they certainly did not think of going back 3000 years!

## Endnotes

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<sup>1</sup> H. Trotter. 'Account of the Pundit's Journey in Great Tibet from Leh in Ladakh to Lhasa and of His Return to India via Assam', *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society of London*, Vol.21, No.4, (1876-1877), pp.325-326. Nain Singh was awarded a gold medal by the Royal Geographical Society.

<sup>2</sup> Dorothy Woodman. *Himalayan Frontiers: A Political Review of British, Chinese, Indian and Russian Rivalries*, London: The Cresset Press, 1969, p.49.

<sup>3</sup> Incidentally, F.E. Younghusband who had been sent on an exploratory mission in that region in 1889 wrote in his *Report of a Mission to the Northern Frontier of India*, '...Chinese certainly made no pretensions to any authority on the southern side of the Kuen Lun mountains.' [pp.99-100]

<sup>4</sup> G.N.Rao. *The India-China Border: A Reappraisal*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, reprint in 2009, First edn 1968, p.56.

<sup>5</sup> Alastair Lamb. *The Sino-Indian Border in Ladakh*, University of South Carolina Press, First American Edition, 1973, p.48.

<sup>6</sup> C.V.Ranganathan and Vinod C. Khanna *India and China: The Way Ahead After Mao's India War*, Delhi: Har Anand Publications, 2000.

<sup>7</sup> Since this treaty was signed by the then Chinese government, this is the only sector of the India-China border that PRC accepted as being settled, though for quite some time it did not accept Sikkim as part of India. However, as the Doklam crisis was to show, in the absence of a jointly conducted demarcation there is a disagreement about the precise location on the ground of the boundary defined in the agreement.

<sup>8</sup> Alastair Lamb. *British India and Tibet 1766-1910*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986 p.264.

<sup>9</sup> As we know, eventually the ambivalent concept of 'suzerainty' was overwhelmed by straightforward 'sovereignty' when China became sufficiently powerful.

<sup>10</sup> Frustrated by lack of clarity relating to the concepts of 'Inner & 'Outer' Lines, Curzon had this to say in an Office Note he penned on 27 August 1899: 'we seem to do things in a rather unscientific and haphazard manner (so far as boundary, authority and jurisdiction are concerned) upon the North-East Frontier'

<sup>11</sup> Parshotam Mehra. *The McMahon Line and After: A Study of the Triangular Contest on India's North-eastern Frontier between Britain, China and Tibet, 1904-1947*, Delhi: Macmillan, 1974, p.88.

<sup>12</sup> Parshotam Mehra. *The North-Eastern Frontier: A Documentary Study of the Internecine Rivalry between India, Tibet and China Vol.I 1906-14*, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1979.

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<sup>13</sup> NAI, Foreign Department, Secret-E, October 1911, Nos. 52-123.

<sup>14</sup> NAI, Foreign Department, March 1911, Nos. 102-351.

<sup>15</sup> Contrary to the assertion by some critics of McMahon, the brilliant Ivan Chen and his team was certainly aware of what was agreed to between the British and the Tibetans, but they were obsessed with the Inner-Outer Tibet blue line.

<sup>16</sup> Later during the World War II the Japan factor recurred in a different form: the British fear that Chinese would stir up propaganda in China and the USA that while their ally China was involved in a deadly struggle against Japan, the British were busy at their old game of imperialist aggrandisement at their expense. Mehra reproduces a message from the Secretary of State to Viceroy in April 1943 along those lines in his *The McMahon Line and After* pp. 455-56 footnote.

<sup>17</sup> NAI, External Affairs Department, Secret, 1943, No. 63(2)-X.

<sup>18</sup> NAI, External Affairs Department, 1940, No. 940-X.

<sup>19</sup> NAI, External Affairs Department, Secret, 1939, Nos. 312-X.

<sup>20</sup> NAI, Foreign Department, External-A, February 1913 nos. 171-186.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> NAI, Foreign & Political, External-B, Secret. 1932. Nos. 261-X

<sup>23</sup> Cited in Noorani, p. 208.



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