Admiral Arun Prakash, Chairman NMF,
Admiral Nirmal Verma, Chief of Naval Staff,
Commodore Uday Bhaskar,
Ladies and Gentlemen.

Thank you for asking me to speak to you on the maritime imperatives of Indian foreign policy. Since its establishment, your Foundation has done remarkable work to raise awareness and promote a discussion of India’s maritime destiny. This has not been easy in a country which has developed continental fixations, despite having longer maritime boundaries than those on land. It is an honour and a privilege to speak to you on this subject.

I will not try to tell you what you know better than me, namely, how important the ocean is to India’s future. Our maritime policies will be a major determinant of success or failure in our attempt to transform India into a modern, plural, open, advanced country that is both secure and prosperous. What I would like to do here is to dwell on what our maritime imperatives are, and how they are reflected in our foreign policy. In the process, we might look at some relevant issues and developments, suggest elements for a suitable strategy, and attempt a brief prognosis for the immediate future.

**History**

History shows that India was most prosperous and secure when she was most connected to the world, and that this connection was mainly by sea. It is well known that we are an ancient sea-faring nation, as the four thousand year old port at Lothal and other Indus Valley finds show. What is less well documented or taught is the extent to which the sea was the major means of our links with the world to the west and the east. “Periplus of the Erythrean Sea” displays knowledge of the winds, currents and the monsoons for those sailing to the west which must have been gathered for centuries well before
the time of Christ. While Buddhism’s spread overland in the second half of the first millennium is known, the earliest travel and trade with China was by the sea route, and this was how Buddhism first came to China and East Asia. Satavahana, Chola, Pallava, Chera and Pandyan prosperity and security were based on a maritime strategy that included South East Asia.

Jawaharlal Nehru’s conclusion from our history was that: “We cannot afford to be weak at sea. History has shown that whoever controls the Indian Ocean has, in the first instance, India’s sea-borne trade at her mercy and, in the second, India’s very independence itself.”

Then why did we develop what can only be called a continental mindset in our grand strategy? One reason may have been the closing of the Indian mind after the fourteenth century, particularly in the northern Gangetic plain. In the rest of India the middle centuries of the last millennium saw considerable maritime activity. The construction of spectacular marine forts along both coasts in this period deserves much more study than it has received so far. The continental mindset really set in later, during the centuries of colonial rule. Recognising the significance of the oceans to its control of India, the colonial rulers relinquished this area of strategic significance last even to the British government in India and then to Indians. Curzon was the first (and possibly the last) Viceroy of India to write to London about the importance to India of control of key choke points from the Horn of Africa to the Cape of Good Hope to the Malacca Straits, and of the need to prevent an inimical power from making an entry into the Indian Ocean. He was promptly asked to mind his own business and to leave the Royal Navy and their affairs to the authorities in London.

The result was that the government of free India inherited a limited maritime vision reinforced by severe resource constraints. There were significant objective capacity limitations in the decades just after independence. These included technology denial and lack of indigenous technological capacity, and US arms embargoes in 1965, 1974 and 1998. These constraints meant that even when Indian intent or thought was present, there was a strategy-policy mismatch. (The Army and Air Force generally received allocations twice the percentage allocated to the Indian Navy.)

The Imperatives

But whatever the mindset, the facts of India’s geography and history are inescapable. What was true in history is equally or even more true today. In
the midst of the third largest ocean in the world, India’s location is in many ways her destiny. The seas, especially the Indian Ocean, are vital to India’s interests. Transport by water remains the cheapest form available. And even when we speak of cyberspace, 95% of internet traffic is at some stage carried under the sea by underwater cables. Maritime trade and energy supplies are critical to India’s transformation.

Consider some statistics. Today 90% of global commerce and 65% of all oil travels by sea. Of this half the world’s container traffic and 70% of the total traffic of petroleum products is accounted for by the Indian Ocean.

Energy: India depends on oil for over 33% of her energy needs, and imports almost 70% of that. We import coal from ten countries, (including Mozambique, South Africa, Indonesia and Australia), many of which are Indian Ocean littorals. This is also true of our LNG imports (from Qatar, Malaysia, Indonesia and South Africa).

The IEA estimates that global energy demand will grow by at least 45% between 2006 and 2030, and that half that increase will come from India and China. We are both at an energy intensive phase of our development. Between 1990 and 2003, oil consumption in India and China grew by 7% on average, against 0.8% in the rest of the world. By 2050 India could be the largest importer of oil in the world. Thus both India and China face a “Hormuz dilemma”. For China this is compounded by a “Malacca dilemma” as well.

Given the need for energy security, it is therefore natural that Indian companies would operate oil tank farms in Trincomalee and seek a role in oilfields from Sakhalin to Myanmar to Central Asia to Iran, Egypt, Sudan, Angola and elsewhere.

Add to this our other maritime interests: almost 5 million Indians work in the Gulf and West Asia and the significance of the remittances they send home cannot be underestimated. Populations of Indian origin are scattered through the littoral states of the Indian Ocean. India also has a mineral rich EEZ which is well over 2 million square km in area.

And then there is security, even in the limited classical military sense of the word. As the events in Mumbai last November 26 showed, the same Indian Ocean that carries our energy and goods is also used by our enemies to attack us. The threats from terrorism, smuggling, piracy, transnational crimes, and proliferation that the Indian Navy’s 2004 Maritime Doctrine warned about have all come true in the last few years. The geostrategic significance of the
Indian Ocean is clear from the fact that about 60,000 ships transit through it each year.

Let us look a little more closely at the phenomenon of piracy off the Horn of Africa from the Somali coast. Through ad hoc arrangements, the navies of several Indian Ocean countries, NATO and China and Japan are cooperating in fighting this menace. This experience shows what international cooperation can do to keep the sea lanes open, but also suggests the limitations of military responses to such complex phenomena. There are about 20,000 ship transits through the affected area every year. As against this so far this year there have been about 135 pirate attacks from the Somali coast and 28 vessels have been successfully commandeered. My point is simple. One must re-examine the cost effectiveness of conventional military force in dealing with these new threats. This is no longer just a case of dealing with pirates on the Spanish Main or off the Barbary Coast. Given the stakes involved, and the nature of piracy today, a broader set of comprehensive measures with much wider international participation is essential to deal with this problem. I will return to this aspect later.

Foreign Policy

How do these three major maritime imperatives, of trade, energy and security impact on our foreign policy?

The Indian Ocean is already centre-stage in international politics. When you think of issues that have concerned India in the recent past – the attacks on Mumbai, the end of the Sri Lankan civil war, piracy off the Horn of Africa, the rise of China, energy security and trade, and instability in our periphery—each of them has involved the Indian Ocean or its littoral countries in one way or the other.

Clearly India sits astride key and crucial sea lines of communication for energy security and trade and for the world economy, and especially for China and Japan.

Over the last few years we have worked with friendly foreign governments in the Asia-Pacific to enhance our naval cooperation, agreeing OTRs (for operational turn around), conducting joint naval exercises and working with others on issues of maritime security. We, along with other countries, are learning as we go. There is a natural tendency, at this initial stage of effort, to confuse the formal declaratory parts of such activity, (defence agreements,
formal visits and talks and the words of communiqués, for instance,) with the actual substance of these relations. In terms of intensity and content, these exchanges in Asia are still far less than those in the Atlantic or Mediterranean. Because they occur in a regional and global context that is changing so rapidly, and when the relative balance of power in the area is shifting and evolving, we need to be careful of the effect of these formal and informal demonstrations of intent on others.

The other aspect where we are learning as we go is our institutional capacity to make foreign policy and to integrate maritime considerations into foreign policy decision-making. That we have been able to do so in the last few years is due to the informal coordination and understanding that MEA, MOD and the IN were able to maintain. This needs to be institutionalised and developed to include other parts of government which also have a role in such policy formation and implementation.

There is no question that there is a much clearer recognition within the government of India today of the importance of the maritime factor in our foreign policy choices. India’s active quest for stronger ties with significant Indian Ocean littorals like Myanmar, Iran, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Oman and others is proof of this, as is the active “naval diplomacy” that we have undertaken over the last few years. Neighbours like the Maldives and Sri Lanka are crucial to the security of this area. The Indian Navy’s exemplary response to the 2006 tsunami and the Indian Ocean Symposium and IONS initiative are visible examples. And these have been backed up by the issue of two Maritime Doctrine documents for public discussion.

India is now beginning to discuss and act on her responsibilities in the Indian Ocean, whether humanitarian or in terms of providing public goods such as keeping the peace and freedom of navigation and trade. And this is being done in a cooperative manner with other friendly navies and states. The exercises with friendly navies, our discussions in various official and quasi or non-official forums, all reflect this new understanding. And these must continue and be intensified.

This recognition is now also entering the realm of public debate in India, just as it is entering strategic discourse in the rest of the world. Unfortunately, much of the debate is framed solely in terms of India-China rivalry. This is especially true of strategists in India and China themselves, though not of their governments. The terms in which the argument is presented are limited and would be self-fulfilling predictions, were governments to act upon them. Nor
are they based on an examination of objective interests of the states concerned.

Let us look at the facts. There are no Chinese bases in the Indian Ocean today despite talk of a “string of pearls”, (which, by the way, is a pretty ineffective murder weapon as any “Clue” aficionado will tell you). At the same time, there is extensive Chinese port development activity in Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan, and active weapons supply programmes to the same states. The question is whether and to what extent this improved access and infrastructure will translate into basing arrangements and political influence in future.

There are also Chinese interests involved. For China, as for India and Japan, her energy security is intimately linked to keeping the sea lanes open in the Indian Ocean. The threats to energy flows in the Indian Ocean come not from the major powers, (such as India, the USA, China or Japan), all of whom have a shared interest in keeping these sea lanes working. The immediate threats come from local instability and problems in the choke points and certain littorals, particularly the Straits of Hormuz and the Horn of Africa. These will not be solved simply by an application of military force, just as piracy off the Horn of Africa cannot be. This is a test of wisdom and is where China and other states can choose to be part of the solution rather than of the problem.

My question is therefore: if energy and trade flows and security are the issues, why not begin discussing collective security arrangements among the major powers concerned? Is it not time that we began a discussion among concerned states of a maritime system minimising the risks of interstate conflict and neutralising threats from pirates, smugglers, terrorists, and proliferators? India’s concerns in the north-west Indian Ocean and China’s vulnerabilities in the north-east Indian Ocean cannot be solved by military means alone. The issue is not limited just to the Indian Ocean but indeed is one of security of these flows in areas and seas which affect the choke points. These arrangements should deal with transnational issues such as piracy, crime and natural disasters. Now that Asian states and powers have evolved the capabilities and demonstrated the will to deal with these questions, it is time that a structured discussion among them and the major littorals took place.

What is proposed here is different from what has been suggested elsewhere, for instance by Robert Kaplan in the March-April issue of Foreign Affairs, namely, that the US act as “sea-based balancer” or “honest broker” between India and China in the Indian Ocean. Which major power would not like to play
the role of balancer, given the chance? It is cheaper and easier and leaves the real work to the powers being balanced. For a superpower that is refocusing on Asia but finding the landscape considerably changed while she was preoccupied with Iraq and Afghanistan, this would naturally be an attractive option. But is it likely that two emerging states like India and China, with old traditions of state-craft, would allow themselves to remain the objects of someone else’s policy, no matter how elegantly expressed? I think not.

Instead, what is suggested is a real concert of Asian powers, including the USA which has a major maritime presence and interests in Asia, to deal with issues of maritime security in all of Asia’s oceans. As Asia becomes more integrated from Suez to the Pacific, none of Asia’s seas or oceans can be considered in isolation. This would be a major cooperative endeavour, and a test of Asian statesmanship.

It will be asked whether this quest is not utopian when the global and regional balance of power is shifting so rapidly, when there is a major build-up of naval strength taking place in Asia, and when each major Asian power is convinced that the future will be better for them, or at least that their relative position will improve rather than worsen in the years to come. It is precisely when uncertainty in the international system is higher than it has been for a long time, when the stakes are greatest, that the need for such an exercise is sharpest and it has the most chance of success. In any case, we will not know until we try, discussing these ideas with others.

Thank you for your patient hearing. I would be most interested in your comments and views, and would be happy to answer any questions.